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INTERACTION BETWEEN REGULATORY




S Chief Judge Stephen Breyer of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit observes in the opening paragraph of a new book,
"Regulators try to make our lives safer by eliminating or reducing
our exposure to certain potentially risky substances."' In his book Breyer
chooses to focus upon "the regulatory effort to reduce exposure to cancer-
causing substances, both because of its illustrative power and because the
public's fear of cancer currently drives the system."'2 For these same rea-
sons, this Article likewise focuses primarily on chemicals known or sus-
pected to cause cancer in humans. Exposures to these chemicals are
controlled by regulators under federal environmental, occupational, food
and drug, and consumer product safety laws. Furthermore, exposures may
also lead to toxic tort litigation based on allegations that the exposures re-
sulted in cancer, increased risk of cancer, or fear of cancer in individual
plaintiffs.
Breyer states, "I do not believe the tort system can serve as a substitute for
government regulation."' 3 This Article asserts that the converse of Breyer's
proposition is also true, namely, that government regulation can, and in-
creasingly will, serve as a substitute for the tort system, and that the actions
of government regulators with respect to chemical exposures will in many
instances control tort law activity. The Article discusses a trend toward in-
creasing willingness of common law courts to draw upon regulatory conclu-
sions in determining issues of policy and fact raised in tort litigation.4
* John Endicott, an attorney with the Dallas law firm of Gardere & Wynne, is a 1972
graduate of the University of Pennsylvania School of Law. Prior to joining Gardere & Wynne,
Mr. Endicott spent nine years as a tort litigator with Maxus Energy Corporation in Dallas.
1. STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION 3 (1993).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 59.
4. Another federal judge and prolific author, Judge Jack Weinstein of the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of New York, has recently cited "the lack to date of an effective
national administrative regulatory scheme capable of controlling undesirable conduct by man-
ufacturers" as a factor that has "left the state and federal courts to their own devices" in
dealing with toxic tort litigation. Jack B. Weinstein & Eileen B. Hershenov, The Effect of
Equity on Mass Tort Law, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 269, 270. This Article takes the view that
there are a growing number of exceptions to Judge Weinstein's blanket criticism of the regula-
SMU LAW REVIEW
The regulatory system for controlling carcinogenic and other chemical
risks is relatively new, having received the lion's share of its authority and
resources from federal legislation enacted in the 1970s and 1980s. As this
regulatory system continues to develop and mature, it is beginning to offer
answers to many of the same questions that concern courts in toxic tort
litigation: (1) Does the chemical cause cancer in humans? (2) How certain
can we be that it does? (3) If the chemical is a known or suspected carcino-
gen, should it be banned or can it be used with reasonable safety if an ade-
quate warning is given? (4) If the latter, what exactly should the warning
say?
When a government agency has offered answers to one or more of these
questions, there are a number of overlapping rationales available for con-
cluding that the agency's determination should control the court's subse-
quent determination of the same question: (a) rejection of expert testimony
that does not conform to generally accepted scientific knowledge, (b) judicial
deference to legislative fact-finding, (c) express or implied preemption, and
(d) tort law adoption of standards of conduct established by statute or regu-
lation. 5 These points are developed in detail in Sections III-VI of this Arti-
cle. First, however, it is helpful to provide a recapitulation of regulatory
approaches to controlling chemical risks.
II. QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT AND ITS LIMITATIONS
When issues of chemical safety are raised, it would seem that a govern-
ment agency or a common law court has two basic options: control the
exposure to a reasonably safe level, or, if it is determined there is no reason-
ably safe level of exposure, eliminate the exposure by banning the chemical
outright. Chemical bans are infrequent and may be overturned when chal-
lenged. For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit re-
cently overturned an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rule
promulgated under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), banning the
use of asbestos in almost all products. 6 The court found that "Congress did
not enact TSCA as a zero-risk statute ' 7 and that "the EPA [had] failed to
show that there is not some intermediate state of regulation that would be
superior to both the currently-regulated and the completely-banned world." 8
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 likewise does not require
risk-free regulation of carcinogenic chemicals, as the U.S. Supreme Court
tory system, and that the system has matured to an extent that common law courts are left
considerably less "to their own devices" in dealing with toxic substances than they formerly
were.
5. This last rationale is reflected in comment (a) to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288C
(1964). This comment provides that the court may, in its discretion, adopt a legislative or
regulatory standard as the legal test of due care that is "sufficient for the occasion," at least
"where there are no special circumstances." Id. § 288C cmt. a. This provision, which has
almost never been used to bar liability, is particularly suited for use in toxic tort litigation
involving chemicals subject to regulatory exposure and warning standards.
6. Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1207 (5th Cir. 1991).
7. Id. at 1215.
8. Id. at 1217.
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held in 1980 when it overturned a benzene exposure standard issued by the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), in a decision com-
monly referred to as Benzene.9 The Court noted that in the case of carcino-
gens such as benzene, both labor and "industry witnesses agreed that if the
standard must ensure with absolute certainty that every single worker is pro-
tected from any risk of leukemia, only a zero exposure limit would suffice."' 0
The Court went on to hold that while the statute called for the agency to
promulgate a standard reasonably necessary to provide a "safe" workplace,
"'safe' is not the equivalent of 'risk-free.' "I' Instead, the Court ruled that a
workplace could not "be considered 'unsafe' unless it threatens the workers
with a significant risk of harm."' 2 The Court then offered the following
illustration to give the agency some guidance in determining what might
constitute significant risk:
Some risks are plainly acceptable and others are plainly unacceptable.
If, for example, the odds are one in a billion that a person will die from
cancer by taking a drink of chlorinated water, the risk clearly could not
be considered significant. On the other hand, if the odds are one in a
thousand that regular inhalation of gasoline vapors that are 2% ben-
zene will be fatal, a reasonable person might well consider the risk sig-
nificant and take appropriate steps to decrease or eliminate it.13
In suggesting that a one-in-a-thousand risk could be near the outer limit of
a tolerable risk under OSHA's governing statute, Benzene impliedly en-
dorsed the notion that quantitative risk assessment (QRA) for carcinogens is
an enterprise that is not only feasible, but also incumbent upon OSHA to
perform when setting standards for carcinogens. Since the Court decided
Benzene in 1980, risk assessors at OSHA and other agencies have striven to
provide QRAs for a variety of chemicals. 14 For example, OSHA is currently
considering whether to lower the permitted average daily exposure limit for
the suspect carcinogen Methylene Chloride (MC) from the currently permit-
ted level of 500 parts per million (ppm) to the proposed level of twenty-five
ppm. In a November 1991 notice of proposed rulemaking, OSHA con-
cluded its "Preliminary Quantitative Risk Assessment" for MC by estimat-
ing that "at the proposed level of twenty-five ppm, the [lifetime cancer] risk
9. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 659 (1980).
10. Id. at 636 n.41.
11. Id. at 642.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 655-56.
14. Hard on the heels of Benzene came two official reports describing in some detail how
QRA might be performed. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, CONGRESS OF THE
UNITED STATES, ASSESSMENT OF TECHNOLOGIES FOR DETERMINING CANCER RISKS FROM
THE ENVIRONMENT (1981); COMMITTEE ON THE INSTITUTIONAL MEANS FOR ASSESSMENT
OF RISKS TO PUBLIC HEALTH, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT; MANAGING THE PROCESS (1983) [hereinafter NATIONAL RE-
SEARCH COUNCIL]. In the decade since the National Research Council report was issued,
there has been a vast outpouring of literature concerning QRA. Breyer's book contains some
40 pages of endnotes providing references to much of this literature. BREYER, supra note 1, at
85-124. The National Research Council itself has recently published a new study in this area.
See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ISSUES IN RISK ASSESSMENT (1993).
1994]
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is 1.67-2.32 per thousand."' 5 In other words, OSHA estimates that among a
thousand individuals with average daily exposure to 25 ppm of MC for a
working lifetime, there will be 1.67 to 2.32 cancer deaths in addition to the
two to three hundred cancer deaths that would be expected in a non-exposed
population of one thousand persons. 16
OSHA's estimate of increased human cancer risk from MC exposure is
based on a series of extrapolations from the results of high-dose testing of
rodents. A good deal of controversy surrounds QRA derived from animal
bioassays. In the case of Trichloroethylene (TCE), another chlorinated sol-
vent, which, like MC, has been categorized as a suspect carcinogen on the
basis of animal testing, estimates of cancer hazards have varied by a factor of
many millions. Some commentators have observed that these "estimates
provide a range of uncertainty equivalent to not knowing whether one has
enough money to buy a cup of coffee or pay off the national debt."' 17
The lack of certainty involved in QRA based on animal testing stems from
the number of default assumptions that must be made in the absence of sci-
entific knowledge. The National Research Council, for example, offers a
non-exhaustive list of fifty questions that might be asked when performing
risk assessments.18 When scientific data are not available to answer these
questions, as is often the case, certain assumptions must be made in order to
progress to the next step in the risk analysis. Generally, risk assessors, in
making such assumptions, consciously seek to err on the side of standards
that will be more, not less, protective of human health. This is a laudable
goal, but the net result can be a risk estimate that varies from the actual risk
15. Occupational Exposure to Methylene Chloride, 56 Fed. Reg. 57,036, 57,101 (1991).
16. Id.
17. Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J.
ON REG. 89, 92 (1988) (quoting Seth Cothern et al., Estimating Risk to Human Health, 20
ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 111, 115 (1986)). In a criticism directed at the false aura of certainty
that QRA figures portray, at least one commentator has likened QRA to weighing hogs in the
South: "Down there, they put the hog in one pan of a large set of scales, put rocks in the other
pan, one by one, until they exactly balance the weight of the hog. Having done that very
carefully, they guess how much the rocks weigh." BREYER, supra note I, at 108 n.58.
18. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 14, at 29-33. Some of the principal as-
sumptions of QRA as practiced by regulatory agencies are that:
[C]ancer bioassay results in animals are valid predictors of human risk; the most
susceptible animals must be used and challenged with maximum tolerated doses
(MTDs); negative results are not indicative of safety; extrapolation of animal
data to out-of-observed-range low-dose domains must proceed on the basis of
policy-selected but scientifically unverified and highly conservative mathemati-
cal models; positive tests in animals preempt negative epidemiological evidence;
estimates of exposure corresponding to the most exposed individual are to be
utilized in risk assessment; no-effect thresholds for carcinogens do not exist.
Gio B. Gori & W. Gary Flamm, How Sick a Patient? Report of a Workshop on Cancer Risk
Assessment, 14 REG. TOXICOLOGY & PHARMACOLOGY 215, 217 (1991). As these authors also
point out, such default assumptions
are political and administrative conveniences that can be enforced only by au-
thority and only so long as scientific knowledge is not available. In fact they
have been violated over and over again when scientific information becomes
available, as in the cases of d-limonene, melamine, and TCDD. As such, default




by many orders of magnitude. As the Office of Management and Budget has
recently explained:
Suppose that there are ten independent steps in a risk assessment and
prudence dictates assumptions that in each instance result in risk esti-
mates two times the expected value. Such a process would yield a sum-
mary risk estimate that is more than 1,000 times higher than the most
likely risk estimate. Because there are usually many more than ten
steps, and many of them will incorporate conservative biases that ex-
ceed a [two times] order of magnitude, risk estimates based on such
practices will often exceed the most likely value by a factor of one mil-
lion or more.' 9
One such conservative assumption made by regulators involves estimating
risk on the basis of the animal studies that find a carcinogenic effect and
ignoring studies of other species that find no effect or a lesser effect. As a
recent editorial in Science points out, the National Institute of Occupational
Safety and Health has based its QRA for butadiene, used in the production
of synthetic rubber, solely upon experiments performed on a particularly
cancer-prone strain of mouse, disregarding results of rat, monkey, and
human studies "showing major differences in uptake, retention and metabo-
lism, and far less risk of cancer."' 20 The editorial notes that a long-term
study of butadiene workers showed "overall mortality from cancer was only
75% of that of the rate for the ordinary public."'21
Even where human data demonstrate that there is indeed a carcinogenic
effect in humans, the human data may likewise be ignored by regulatory risk
assessment in favor of the animal data. In the case of vinyl chloride, a sub-
stance known to cause a rare form of cancer, angiosarcoma of the liver,
the most recent default risk assessment model predicts (at historical
doses) that up to 7500 workers out of 10,000 workers exposed would
contract angiosarcomas of the liver as an upper bound. In the epidemi-
ological study results, on the other hand, less than 10 out of 10,000
workers exposed at those levels during the 1940's, 50's and 60's have
contracted the disease.22
Lately, even regulators have begun to question the worth of high-dose
animal testing as a basis for estimating human effects. According to a recent
news report:
GAITHERSBURG, MD., March 20 [1993]
Dozens of caged rats and mice spend their days here in a laboratory
chewing on Purina rodent chow laced with as much boric acid as they
can tolerate without risk of death from [acute] poisoning.
This project is just one of roughly 65 rodent studies underway at 15
19. BREYER, supra note 1, at 110 n.70 (quoting OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,
REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES 26 (Apr. 1, 1990-Mar. 31, 1991)).
20. Philip H. Abelson, Exaggerated Carcinogenicity of Chemicals, 256 SCIENCE 1609,
1609 (1992).
21. Id.
22. Neil C. Hawkins, Health Risk Assessment: The Right Tool for the Job?, in How
CLEAN IS CLEAN? 130, 134 (Air & Waste Management Ass'n ed., 1991).
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laboratories across the country at an average cost of about $2 million
each. For much of the last two decades, these studies have been the
Government's most important diagnostic tool for identifying environ-
mental problems that are health hazards and setting priorities for Fed-
eral regulation.
BILLIONS DOWN THE DRAIN?
[E]ven Dr. Kenneth Olden, director of the National Institute of Envi-
ronmental Health Sciences, the branch of the National Institutes of
Health that directs the animal studies, asks whether the nation is wast-
ing billions of dollars regulating substances that might pose little risk.
The findings from about 450 animal studies over the last several de-
cades, Dr. Olden said, have led Federal and state governments to write
thousands of regulations forcing government and industry to spend tens
of billions of dollars a year regulating the use and disposal of several
dozen chemicals, or finding alternatives for chemicals that have been
restricted or banned....
By the time Dr. Olden took over as director of the Health Sciences
Institute in 1991, the animal studies were increasingly being called into
question. Almost immediately, he empaneled a group of the nation's
leading experts to study his agency's toxicology-research program to
help him decide whether to look for a new approach.
Last summer, the group's report said many of the assumptions driv-
ing the rat and mouse research "do not appear to be valid." The ex-
perts particularly questioned the practice of feeding rodents the
"maximum tolerated dose" of the chemical being tested ....
"The problem is we don't know what the findings really mean," Dr.
Robert Maronpot, chief of the institute's experimental-pathology labo-
ratory, said of the animal studies. 23
OSHA's proposed 25 ppm MC exposure limit is, as noted above, derived
from QRA based on animal testing. Hearings were held in the fall of 1992,
and Robert Maronpot, quoted in the above article, testified concerning the
results of experiments in which rodents developed cancer when exposed to
2000 ppm of MC. 24 At the hearings, industry representatives argued that
the limit should be 50 ppm or higher, while labor representatives argued for
a limit of 10 ppm or lower. One reason for these divergent numbers lies in a
dispute between industry and labor as to whether the proposed 25 ppm limit
is economically "feasible," an issue that OSHA's governing statute requires
OSHA to consider. OSHA has taken the entire matter under advisement
and is expected to issue a final exposure limit in 1994.
III. TOXIC TORT LITIGATION: DAUBER T AND THE
"KNOWLEDGE" STANDARD
Meanwhile, in the summer of 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its first
23. Joel Brinkley, Many Say Lab-Animal Tests Fail to Measure Human Risk, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 23, 1993, at Al (national edition). The reference to the experts' report questioning use of
animal data is to National Toxicology Program (NTP), Final Report of the Advisory Review
by the NTP Board of Scientific Counselors, 57 Fed. Reg. 31,721 (1992).
24. Author's review of hearing testimony at OSHA Docket Office in Washington, D.C.
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decision concerning the standards of admissibility of scientific testimony in a
toxic tort case. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.25 involved a
claim that birth defects suffered by the plaintiffs resulted from their mothers'
ingestion of the anti-nausea drug Bendectin. The Court's narrow holding
was that the Frye26 "general acceptance" test of admissibility of expert testi-
mony did not survive the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence.27 In
addition, the Court elaborated that under Federal Rule of Evidence 702,
"[t]he subject of an expert's testimony must be 'scientific ... knowledge.'
The adjective 'scientific' implies a grounding in the methods and procedures
of science. Similarly, the word 'knowledge' connotes more than subjective
belief or unsupported speculation."'28
When QRA based on animal testing, as performed by government regula-
tory agencies and as described in the preceding section of this Article, is
measured against the standards of scientific proof in tort litigation an-
nounced in Daubert, it would seem self-evident that QRA falls far short of
the Daubert standards. To illustrate this point, one of the numerous con-
servative assumptions that regulatory agencies have used in performing
QRA is "straight line extrapolation" from high-dose test results to low-dose
expected health effects. This procedure assumes that at 1/100 and 1/1000 of
the high dose tested, the risk of cancer is exactly 1/100 and 1/1000 of the
risk detected at the high dose. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia noted in approving this practice for regulatory purposes,
This method ... will show some risk at every level because of the rules
of arithmetic rather than because of any knowledge. In fact the risk at a
certain point on the extrapolated line may have no relationship to real-
ity; there is no particular reason to think that the actual line of the
incidence of harm is represented by a straight line.29
Even when using a more biologically plausible extrapolation procedure,
the EPA itself has cautioned:
It should be emphasized that the linearized multistage procedure leads
to a plausible upper limit to the risk that is consistent with some pro-
posed mechanisms of carcinogenesis. Such an estimate, however, does
not necessarily give a realistic prediction of the risk. The true value of
the risk is unknown, and may be as low as zero.30
As is clear from these passages, which both expressly disclaim that either
procedure reflects "knowledge" as to the true risk, any estimate of risk that
depends upon either extrapolation procedure will fail to meet the "knowl-
edge" requirement announced in Daubert.
The Supreme Court in Daubert also observed that, ordinarily, a key ques-
tion to be answered in determining whether a theory or technique is scien-
25. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
26. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
27. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794.
28. Id. at 2795 (footnote omitted).
29. Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en
banc) (emphasis added).




tific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact will be whether it can be (and
has been) tested.31 The importance placed by Daubert on testability may
derive from one of the amicus briefs filed with the Court:
One of the few briefs that proposes a method for screening scientific
testimony was filed by the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technol-
ogy, and Government.... [T]he brief urges the Court to apply a three-
step test in which judges ask of a scientific claim: Is it testable? Has it
been empirically tested? And has the testing been carried out according
to a scientific methodology? A negative answer on any one of these
points, Carnegie argues, should disqualify the evidence. 32
A persistent issue in toxic tort litigation, which the Court did not reach in
Daubert, involves the admissibility of animal studies to prove that a chemical
is a human carcinogen. The Carnegie Commission amicus brief indicates
that when "a plaintiff relies solely on animal studies," it may be proper to
allow the case to go to the jury "since a high correlation does in general exist
with regard to human and animal reactions." 3 3 The brief also argues that
the legal issue raised by animal studies relates to the sufficiency and not to
the admissibility of the evidence, and is "ultimately a policy issue that an
appellate court may have to resolve."' 34
The "high correlation between human and animal reactions" cited in the
Carnegie Commission brief is, however, misleading. It is true that, of the
fewer than twenty chemicals that have been identified as carcinogenic to
humans based upon epidemiological studies and that have also been tested
on rodents, the predictive value from humans to rats of some carcinogenic
response is seventy-five percent and is seventy-seven percent from humans to
mice. 35 What one wants to know in public health and in toxic tort litigation,
however, is the answer to a different question, namely:
[w]hether chemicals that have been shown to be carcinogenic in experi-
mental animals are also carcinogenic in humans. This question cannot
be answered by reversing the question (i.e., by asking whether chemicals
that are human carcinogens are also carcinogenic in a rodent species)
because even if most human carcinogens are rodent carcinogens [as they
are], the converse does not necessarily follow, as can be demonstrated
by a simple probabilistic argument.36
Daubert's ruling that a scientific claim, such as that a human carcinogenic
effect can be accurately predicted from the results of animal testing, is inad-
31. 113 S. Ct. at 2796-97 (citing KARL R. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS:
THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed. 1989) (stating that "the criterion of
the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability")).
32. Eliot Marshall, Supreme Court to Weigh Science, 259 SCIENCE 588, 590 (1993).
33. Brief of the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government as Ami-
cus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 23-24, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993) (No. 92-102) [hereinafter Carnegie Commission Briefi.
34. Id. at 24.
35. Lois S. Gold et al., Target Organs in Chronic Bioassays of 533 Chemical Carcinogens,
93 ENVT'L HEALTH PERSP. 233, 245 (1991). Accurate prediction of cancer effects in specific
target organs, for example the human lung to mouse lung, is much lower.
36. Id. (citing D.A. Freedman & H. Zeisel, From Mouse to Man: The Quantitative Assess-
ment of Cancer Risks, 3 STAT. SCI. 3 (1988)).
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missible if it is not testable is inconsistent with the Carnegie Commission's
position that expert testimony based on animal data alone is admissible evi-
dence and can only be challenged on grounds of evidentiary insufficiency.
The latter position ignores that the entire purpose of the regulatory system is
to attempt to identify potential human carcinogens by testing them on ani-
mals and thereafter controlling human exposure to chemicals thus identified
as posing a possible human risk. This system is designed precisely to avoid
the accumulation of cases of human cancer that would be necessary to "test"
the hypotheses that the animal carcinogen in question also causes cancer in
humans, or that most animal carcinogens are also human carcinogens.
As discussed above, the system is also conservatively designed so that it
may identify as possible human carcinogens a certain number of substances
that are in fact not carcinogenic to humans, or are insignificantly so, at ordi-
nary human exposure levels. Such noncarcinogens will nevertheless be con-
trolled in the same manner as the chemicals that are true carcinogens such
that, if the system is working properly, it will never be possible to distinguish
the actual human carcinogens from the noncarcinogens.37 Although, as
noted above, questions have been raised as to whether the system is exces-
sively conservative, it does appear to be working reasonably well in terms of
its primary purpose, which is to avoid, not confirm, identification of actual
human carcinogens. The National Toxicology Program's 1991 Sixth Annual
Report on Carcinogens, for example, is required by Section 301(b)(4)(A)(i)
of the Public Health Service Act to separate substances into two categories:
(1) substances "known" to be carcinogens because of sufficient evidence
from human studies and (2) substances "reasonably anticipated" to be car-
cinogens based on animal studies and/or limited evidence from human stud-
ies.38 The list contains only twenty-three known carcinogens, as opposed to
150 suspect carcinogens.3 9 Only five of the twenty-three known carcinogens
are in widespread use: arsenic, asbestos, benzene, chromium, and vinyl chlo-
ride, each of which has been identified as a human carcinogen for two de-
37. The rationale for the system is the same as for Pascal's famous wager. Blaise Pascal, a
seventeenth century French philosopher and mathematician, made the following argument for
belief in God:
Let us . . . say "God is, or He is not." But to which side shall we incline?
Reason can decide nothing here.... A game is being played at the extremity of
[an] infinite distance where heads or tails will turn up. What will you wager?
According to reason, you can do neither the one thing nor the other; according
to reason, you can defend neither of the propositions.
Do not [say]... "The true course is not to wager at all." [Y]ou must wager.
It is not optional. You are embarked. Which will you choose then?... Let us
weigh the gain and loss in wagering that God is. Let us estimate the two
chances. If you gain, you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing. Wager, then,
without hesitation that He is.
BLAISE PASCAL, PENSEES 233 (W.F. Trotter trans., 1952).
The regulatory system is likewise based on a wager that many or most animal carcinogens
are also human carcinogens. The very last thing we want, however, is "knowledge" of the
truth of this proposition, since true knowledge would result in many cases of human cancer,
which we are hoping to avoid through regulatory control.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 241(b)(4)(A)(i) (1988).
39. PUBLIC HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., SIXTH AN-
NUAL REPORT ON CARCINOGENS iii-vii (1991).
1994]
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cades or more, or from about the time that the current regulatory system
began to take hold in the early 1970s.40
Prior to Daubert, courts had divided over the issue of admissibility of
animal studies to prove that a substance is toxic to humans. As a law review
article devoted to this judicial controversy points out, the courts that had
ruled the studies admissible in the past failed to distinguish between the dif-
fering policies of regulatory prudence and evidentiary reliability in tort liti-
gation.4 1 From this point on, however, Daubert's new emphasis on
testability as a criterion for admissibility of scientific testimony in a civil
action, coupled with growing skepticism concerning the meaningfulness of
the animal bioassay program even in the context of the regulatory scheme
for which it was devised, may well lead the great majority of courts to accept
the conclusion of the above-cited article that "animal studies have no place
in the courtroom."'42
IV. DETERMINATION BY A REGULATORY AGENCY OF
INADEQUATE EVIDENCE OF A CAUSAL
RELATIONSHIP: A "LEGISLATIVE FACT?"
The preceding section of this Article asserted that common law courts
should, because of the regulatory agencies' admissions concerning the multi-
ple uncertainties involved in estimating human risk from animal studies, re-
fuse to admit evidence of animal test results in tort litigation. Another
situation in which judicial deference to agency conclusions seems appropri-
ate occurs when the agency, after conducting a careful review to determine
whether a specific health effect is associated with a specific chemical expo-
sure, announces that it is unable to conclude that any cause-and-effect rela-
tion in fact exists. An example of such a review occurred recently when a
panel of ten academic experts convened by the EPA met in April 1993 to
discuss the weight of the evidence regarding the carcinogenicity of 2,4-
Dichlorophenoxyacetic Acid (2,4-D) and its related compounds. After two
days of deliberation and discussion, the consensus of the Joint Committee
was expressed by its Chairman, Genevieve Matanoski, Professor of Epidemi-
ology at Johns Hopkins University:
And I think I'm recapitulating pretty much what the committee has
come down on. So that what we have is: some interesting human stud-
ies that are not confirming each other; an interesting single animal
study that has never been confirmed in another study; and no basic
mechanism from toxicological and genotoxicity data that would
support a potential risk as a carcinogen. So we're left with a very
40. Vinyl Chloride, for example, was identified as a human carcinogen in early 1974,
when a cluster of cases of angiosarcoma of the liver was identified among individuals with
workplace exposure at a B.F. Goodrich plant in Kentucky. See Emergency Temporary Stan-
dard for Exposure to Vinyl Chloride, 39 Fed. Reg. 12,342, 12,342 (1974).
41. Jack L. Landau & W. Hugh O'Riordan, Of Mice and Men: The Admissibility of
Animal Studies to Prove Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation, 25 IDAHO L. REV. 521, 560-65
(1988-89).
42. Id. at 565.
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unsatisfactory weight of the evidence for carcinogenicity for the time I
would believe.43
Immediately following Dr. Matanoski's recapitulation, the other nine
members of the panel expressed their agreement with her summary. Dr.
Matanoski polled the committee members at the conclusion of the meeting
concerning their preferred characterization of the weight of the evidence
concerning 2,4-D carcinogenicity. The voting split between "weakly sugges-
tive," "weakly possible," and "possible." 44
The EPA had previously categorized 2,4-D as a Group D carcinogen (not
classifiable as to human carcinogenicity) following the recommendation of
an earlier scientific review in 1988. 45 It is apparent that the April 1993 re-
view will not lead the EPA to change this classification. A recent article
indicates that the EPA may revisit the issue of 2,4-D carcinogenicity in
1995, once it has in hand the results of various studies concerning 2,4-D
currently being conducted by the National Cancer Institute (NCI). 46 The
NCI studies, when completed, may cast a different light on 2,4-D. As the
Supreme Court noted in Daubert: "Scientific conclusions are subject to per-
petual revision. Law, on the other hand, must resolve disputes finally and
quickly." 47
Daubert also states that the Frye concept of "general acceptance," while
no longer a prerequisite to the admissibility of expert testimony, "can yet
have a bearing on the inquiry."'48 This led a trial court to comment that
"Daubert kills Frye and then resurrects its ghost."'49 In the case of 2,4-D,
the EPA's expert advisory panels are not the only consensus groups to have
determined that the available evidence is insufficient to reach a conclusion
concerning carcinogenicity. NTP, for example, has never listed 2,4-D in any
of its annual reports on carcinogens, and the World Health Organization
(WHO) has likewise concluded that "[a]vailable animal bioassays and epide-
miological studies are inadequate for an assessment of the carcinogenic po-
tential of 2,4-D or of its derivatives."50
When regulatory agencies and other scientific consensus bodies, such as
WHO, generally accept that a particular chemical does not cause a particu-
lar toxic effect, it would appear reasonable for a common law court, when
the same issue of toxicity is raised in a tort action, to accept the consensus
43. Transcript of the Special Joint Committee of the Science Advisory Board and the
FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel on the Weight of Evidence of Carcinogenicity of 2,4-D, at
138 (Apr. 1-2, 1993) (on file with author).
44. Id. at 155.
45. See 2,4-D, 2,4-DB and 2,4-DP; Proposed Decision Not to Initiate a Special Review,
53 Fed. Reg. 9590, 9593 (1988).
46. 2,4-D Further Evaluation Likely: Fenner-Crisp, PESTICIDE & Toxic CHEMICAL
NEWS, July 21, 1993, at 15.
47. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2798 (1993).
48. Id. at 2797.
49. In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 827 F. Supp. 1014, 1033 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
This decision provides a useful review of the many federal and state decisions dealing with the
issue of proving causation in toxic tort litigation.
50. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH CRITERIA 29, 2,4-
DICHLOROPHENOXYACETiC ACID 101 (1984).
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view as binding on the issue. A recent pre-Daubert decision adopted this
approach in dismissing a claim that DPT vaccine had caused a seizure suf-
fered by plaintiff's daughter:
Within recent years numerous governmental and professional bodies
have issued reports which have addressed the question of whether such
vaccine causes permanent neurological damage. Among the authorities
issuing such reports are the Institute of Medicine ... , the Centers for
Disease Control, the Child Neurology Society, the American Academy
of Pediatrics, the American Academy of Neurology, the British Pediat-
ric Association and the National Advisory Committee on Immuniza-
tion of Canada. All of these groups have concluded that existing data
and knowledge does not demonstrate that there is any causal connec-
tion between whole cell DPT vaccine and permanent neurological
damage.51
The court in this case granted the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment on the ground that the product, as a matter of law, was not unreasona-
bly dangerous, questioning: "how can Tri-Immunol be said to be
'unreasonably dangerous' if there is a strong consensus among the majority
of physicians and scientists who have studied the issue that whole cell DPT
vaccine has not been shown to cause permanent neurological damage?" 52
The Bendectin litigation provides an apt illustration of the fact that case-
by-case review of the same general causation issue offers a poor alternative to
judicial deference to a determination of non-toxicity by the responsible
agency, when such a determination is available. A comprehensive review of
this litigation found that there were, as of early 1992, "a total of thirty-six
appellate opinions concerning Bendectin; ' 53 "[a]ll Bendectin cases pose the
same general causation issue;"'54 and plaintiffs "have routinely met with
defeat." 55
Bendectin was voluntarily withdrawn from the market in 1983,56 before
very many of the Bendectin lawsuits had reached trial, and as new scientific
studies continued to be released. Since the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) had no occasion to reconsider its earlier approval of the marketing of
Bendectin after the product was withdrawn in 1983, the manufacturer was
not in a position to defend many cases on the basis of FDA approval, 57
which in any event has not generally been a successful defense for pharma-
51. Pease v. American Cyanamid Co., 795 F. Supp. 755, 757 (D. Md. 1992).
52. Id. at 758 (emphasis added).
53. Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass
Torts, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 301, 375 (1992).
54. Id. at 377.
55. Id. at 385.
56. Louis Lasagna & Sheila R. Shulman, Bendectin and the Language of Causation, in
PHANTOM RISK: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE AND THE LAW 101 (Kenneth R. Foster et al. eds.,
1993).
57. In December 1980, FDA proposed a package insert for Bendectin, that read in part:
"It is not possible to prove that any drug ... is totally free of risk, or absolutely safe, if taken
during pregnancy. In 1 I of 13 studies of women who took this drug during pregnancy, there
was no evidence that it increased the risk of birth defects." Draft Guideline Patient Package
Insert; Bendectin and Other Combination Drugs Containing Doxylamine and Vitamin B-6, 45
Fed. Reg. 80,740, 80,742 (1980). In June 1981, before a Congressional subcommittee, FDA
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ceutical defendants. 58 The appellate courts, however, have with virtual una-
nimity reached the same conclusion of Bendectin safety that the FDA
presumably would have adhered to if the drug were still on the market.
The Bendectin litigation, toward the end of its cycle, resulted in "legisla-
tive fact-finding" by the judiciary: "As a matter of law, Bendectin does not
cause birth defects," as one commentator described the holding in one of the
more recent Bendectin decisions.59 Another study agrees that "the Bendec-
tin causation cases may better be viewed as an instance of the courts making
a finding of legislative fact that Bendectin does not cause birth defects." 6
This process of legislative fact-finding has apparently also taken place in
mass tort litigation involving asbestos.61 Instructive in this regard is the
opinion of Judge Becker of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
concurring only that the New Jersey Supreme Court's decisions denying the
state-of-the-art defense to asbestos manufacturers did not amount to an un-
constitutional denial of equal protection of the law.62 The basis for Judge
Becker's concurring opinion was his belief that the New Jersey Supreme
Court, in singling out asbestos defendants, had "determined a legislative
fact-that, at all relevant times, asbestosis harms were knowable to the in-
dustry. That being the case, the New Jersey Supreme Court has reasonably
decided to preclude endless relitigation of what was 'knowable' to the asbes-
tos industry."' 63 Judge Becker went on to state that "[c]ommon law courts
could not fashion rules grounded in reality if they were obliged to proceed
Commissioner Arthur Hayes "reiterated the FDA's determination that Bendectin did not
cause birth defects." Lasagna & Shulman, supra note 56, at 109.
58. A recent decision collects cases that "have held that FDA certification and regulation
of a product, or a party's compliance with FDA or other governmental regulations, does not
automatically relieve a party of either liability or its duty to warn." Hegna v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 806 F. Supp. 822, 830 (D. Minn. 1992). But see Hurley v. Lederle Labs., 863
F.2d 1173, 1179 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that a decision by the FDA as to the proper wording
of a drug warning label impliedly preempts a state law tort action challenging the adequacy of
the warning, provided that the drug manufacturer can establish that it provided FDA with all
of the necessary and available information on which to base the warning); Collins v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 231 Cal. Rptr. 396, 404 (Ct. App. 1986) (opining that "U]udicial inter-
pretation of the effect of FDA approval by state courts which furthers [the] policy of interstate
consistency is ... preferable to interpretation which undermines this goal").
59. Sanders, supra note 53, at 384 (referring to Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, 897 F.2d 1159(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 950 (1990)).
60. Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances
Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 643, 679
(1992).
61. An example cited by Sanders is a 1990 order for a hearing on a proposed class certifi-
cation which would allow the court to:
Declare and apply federal common law that establishes as a matter of law that
asbestos-containing insulation products ... are inherently dangerous in accord-
ance with the governmental ban and the findings of all federal agencies that have
addressed the question; and that such products were marketed without an ade-
quate warning and were therefore, defective and unreasonably dangerous.
Sanders, supra note 53, at 386 (quoting In re National Asbestos Litig., No. 1:90 CV, 11,000(N.D. Ohio Aug. 10, 1990) (consolidation order), quoted in 5 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at
360-61 (Aug. 15, 1990)).
62. In re Asbestos Litig., 829 F.2d 1233, 1238-39 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
1029 (1988).
63. Id. at 1245.
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without aid of legislative facts." 64
Courts can determine "legislative facts," as Judge Becker indicates, and so
can legislatures and their agents, such as regulatory agencies. As between
courts and regulatory agencies, the latter would appear to have a clear ad-
vantage in determining legislative facts. As U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Blackmun has noted, "all courts . . . face institutional limitations on our
ability to gather information about 'legislative facts.' -65
Medical questions as to whether a particular toxic effect can be caused by
exposure to a particular chemical substance, such as birth defects by Bendec-
tin, or cancer by 2,4-D, are essentially questions of legislative fact. This is
true because of the nature of medicine, which cannot determine causation of
chronic disease from the study of an individual case, but rather bases conclu-
sions concerning causation on studies of large groups of similar cases:
"Although causality operates at the individual level, it is impossible at pres-
ent to study it at that level in systems as complex as a human body. All we
can do is to study populations of similar systems."' 66 Legislative facts are
determined in the same way, by studying groups of cases, not merely a single
case.
67
All toxic tort litigation involving the question of whether a particular
product can cause cancer, or any other toxic effect commonly found in the
general population, has the potential to become mass tort litigation similar
to the Bendectin and asbestos litigation. It may also require determination
of legislative facts concerning medical causation, the nature of a proper
warning, and other such generic issues. Whenever regulatory agencies have
determined such legislative facts after full review, it seems to make very little
64. Id. at 1248.
65. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 927 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring). Judge
David Bazelon, in a speech to the National Academy of Sciences, explaining why Congress
had entrusted the task of controlling environmental risks to regulatory agencies rather than
leaving the task to common law courts, agreed that "[c]ourts lack the technical competence to
resolve scientific controversies; they lack the popular mandate and accountability to make the
critical choices that regulation requires." David L. Bazelon, The Judiciary: What Role in
Health Improvement?, 211 SCIENCE 792, 792 (1981).
66. Ronald N. Giere, Knowledge, Values, and Technological Decisions, in ACCEPTABLE
EVIDENCE: SCIENCE AND VALUES IN RISK MANAGEMENT 193-94 (Deborah G. Mayo &
Rachel D. Hollander eds., 1991). This same insight was expressed some millennia ago by
Aristotle, who stated:
But none of these arts theorize about individual cases. Medicine, for instance,
does not theorize about what will help to cure Socrates or Callias, but only
about what will help to cure any or all of a given class of patients: this alone is
its business: individual cases are so infinitely various that no systematic knowl-
edge of them is possible.
ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC (W. Rhys Roberts trans.), reprinted in GREAT BOOKS OF THE WEST-
ERN WORLD 593, 596 (Robert M. Hutchins ed., 1952).
67. As stated in the standard treatise on administrative law:
An industry-wide question calls for facts about the industry; facts about each
company may be unhelpful and may even get in the way. If a court . . . is
making law to govern an industry of 100 companies, the useful facts are about
the 100 companies as a group, not about each company. The facts about the
group are legislative, even though they are the sum of adjudicative facts about
each company.
3 KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 15:5, at 152-53 (2d ed. 1980).
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sense-from the standpoint of judicial economy and legal consistency-for
dozens or hundreds of courts to attempt to judicially redetermine such legis-
latively-determined facts. The following sections of this Article examine
some rationales for declining to engage in such redetermination.
V. PREEMPTION, EXPRESS AND IMPLIED
In April 1991 the American Law Institute published a two-volume study
entitled Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury.68 One of the issues dis-
cussed in the 1991 study is the preemption doctrine as it applies to tort litiga-
tion. The study states: "The arguments for preemption are strongest when
federal regulation is detailed and comprehensive: [E]xamples include ciga-
rette labelling (where federal preemption has been upheld) and pharmaceuti-
cals and pesticides (where courts have refused to recognize federal
preemption)."'69 The statement that courts have refused to recognize pre-
emption in the pesticide area is no longer true. As a result of the 1992 deci-
sion of the U.S. Supreme Court upholding preemption of tort actions based
on allegations of inadequate cigarette labelling, 70 no fewer than five federal
appellate courts quickly concluded within the following year that the Fed-
eral Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)7 1 likewise pre-
empted common law failure to warn claims involving pesticides. 72
It appears that courts will also accept the preemption defense, post-Cipol-
lone, under the Federal Hazardous Substances Act (FHSA), 73 which is ad-
ministered by the Consumer Product Safety Commission. Noting that
FHSA's preemption language is "almost identical" to the preemption lan-
guage of FIFRA, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently
became the first appellate court to find that FHSA preempted common law
failure to warn claims involving chemicals and other products intended for
household use. 74
68. THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REPORTERS' STUDY: ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBIL-
ITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY (1991) [hereinafter ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY STUDY].
69. Id. at 106.
70. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
71. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988, Supp. II 1990, Supp. III 1991, & Supp. IV 1992).
FIFRA's preemption language is very similar to the preemption language of the cigarette la-
beling statute.
72. See King v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 996 F.2d 1346, 1347 (1st Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 490 (1993); Worm v. American Cyanamid Co., 5 F.3d 744, 747-48 (4th
Cir. 1993); Shaw v. Dow Brands, Inc., 994 F.2d 364, 377 (7th Cir. 1993); Arkansas-Platte &
Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 981 F.2d 1177, 1179 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 60 (1993); Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516, 517 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 300 (1993). All federal courts of appeal that have considered the pesticide preemption
issue post-Cipollone have concluded that preemption exists. As the defense attorney involved
in defending the Papas case is quoted as saying following the U.S. Supreme Court's refusal to
grant certiorari, the "handwriting is now on the wall for the plaintiffs' bar" which had "better
get [inadequate labeling and failure-to-warn claims] out of their lexicon." U.S. High Court
Denies Review in Two Cases Involving Federal Pre-emption of Tort Suits, 8 Toxics L. Rep.
(BNA) No. 20, at 580 (Oct. 20, 1993) (quoting attorney Lawrence S. Ebner).
73. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-1277 (1988, Supp. 11 1990, Supp. Ill 1991, & Supp. IV 1992).
74. Moss v. Parks Corp., 985 F.2d 736, 740 n.3 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2999




One such product, paint stripper containing MC, is the subject of a 1987
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) enforcement policy setting
forth specific warning language, which the CPSC considers "suitable label-
ing for paint strippers containing relatively large amounts of methylene chlo-
ride."' 75 The model labeling contains directions for safe use and also the
following cancer warning: "Contains methylene chloride, which has been
shown to cause cancer in certain laboratory animals. Risk to your health
depends on level and duration of exposure."
76
A hundred different courts and juries might, if the task were entrusted to
them, agree with a hundred different criticisms of the CPSC warning for
paint strippers containing MC. If the FHSA preemption decisions cited
above are accepted in multiple jurisdictions, however, as FIFRA preemption
has been, there will no longer be room for lawsuits based upon claims that a
different or more comprehensive cancer warning than that endorsed by
CPSC should have been given.
VI. BEYOND PREEMPTION
OSHA, in its notice of proposed rulemaking, has suggested cancer hazard
warning language for MC in the workplace. 77 The language would appear
on material safety data sheets, which are the form of hazard communication
used by manufacturers for products sold in bulk quantities (tank truck or
rail car), rather than in labeled containers. In the mid-1980s, OSHA also
promulgated a hazard communication standard imposing certain general
rules governing the distribution and the content of material safety data
sheets for hazardous chemicals. 78 The Occupational Health and Safety Act,
unlike FIFRA and FHSA, however, does not contain language that ex-
pressly preempts state law labeling requirements. 79 As noted above, the
75. U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, Labeling of Certain Household Products
Containing Methylene Chloride; Statement of Interpretation and Enforcement Policy, 52 Fed.
Reg. 34,698, 34,702 (1987).
76. Id.
77. OSHA's proposed language is as follows:
II. Health Hazard Data
2. Long-term (chronic) exposure: The evidence for the carcinogenic potential
of MC is primarily based upon chronic studies in which MC was administered
to three species of laboratory rodents (rats, mice, and hamsters). MC exposure
produced lung and liver tumors in mice and mammary tumors in rats. No car-
cinogenic effects of MC were found in hamsters.
Occupational Exposure to Methylene Chloride, Proposed Rule, 56 Fed. Reg. 57,035, 57,134
(1991).
78. Hazard Communication, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1992).
79. In 1991, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, reversing a lower court deci-
sion, held that the Occupational Safety and Health Act did not expressly or impliedly preempt
a state law tort action based on a claim that the supplier of a hazardous product had failed to
provide an adequate warning. Pedraza v. Shell Oil Co., 942 F.2d 48, 52 (1st Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 993 (1992). The particular substance involved in Pedraza was
Epichlorohydrin, a chemical which is apparently regulated by OSHA in only two respects:
OSHA has set a permissible exposure limit for this substance and requires employers to pro-
vide protective equipment for employees who work with any hazardous substance. Id. at 50.
As the Pedraza court recognized, even if preemption is not expressly provided for in the
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courts, for the same reason, have not found that FDA approval of a pharma-
ceutical product preempts tort litigation relating to the product.80
When the applicable statute does not contain express preemption lan-
guage, an independent rationale may be available for arguing that regulatory
action should control the outcome of toxic tort litigation. For example, one
can argue that notwithstanding the fact that permissible exposure limits are
not formally preemptive of state law tort actions under OSHA, a court
should, as a matter of deference to agency expertise, dismiss a tort action
whenever the alleged injurious exposure to chemicals has not been demon-
strated to have exceeded the OSHA-allowed exposure limits. So far as the
author is aware, this argument has never been made in a case involving an
OSHA-regulated chemical.
A recent decision in the nuclear regulatory area, however, indicates that
the argument for such judicial deference to OSHA expertise is plausible. In
O'Conner v. Commonwealth Edison Co. 81 a radiation worker sued an Illinois
public utility, alleging that he had received a large dose of radiation that
caused him to develop cataracts and other ailments. The plaintiff wore radi-
ation measuring instruments whenever he entered any area of the plant that
contained radiation. The measuring instrument apparently recorded expo-
sures that fell, at all times, within the "permissible dose" set by the Nuclear
federal statute, "preemption will be inferred where the state law 'actually conflicts with federal
law.'" Id. at 51 (quoting English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990)). Where OSHA
has prescribed express warning language for a particular substance, as it has not done for
Epichlorohydrin but now proposes to do for MC, a state law tort claim that a manufacturer
should have provided additional or different warnings might well be preempted under the
"express conflict" branch of the preemption doctrine. Certain portions of the OSHA Hazard
Communication Standard may also provide a basis for such an argument.
In the case of one substance, vinyl chloride, a very strong argument may be made in this
regard. This standard specifies that the following mandatory warning language appear on
containers of polyvinyl chloride:
POLYVINYL CHLORIDE (or TRADE NAME)
Contains
VINYL CHLORIDE
VINYL CHLORIDE IS A CANCER-SUSPECT AGENT
29 C.F.R. § 1910.1017(k)(7)(1)(4) (1992). OSHA's preamble to the adoption of this regulation
makes clear that this is the only language that may appear on the label:
Coupled with the training requirement in the standard, we believe that the signs
and labels required will adequately inform employees of the [cancer] hazard. ...
The proper application of most protective measures requires an amount of train-
ing and indoctrination of employees that cannot easily be conveyed on a sign or
label. Also, the variety of measures that could be prescribed would result in an
unwieldy or excessively detailed legend. Consequently, the required message on
signs and labels will not include information on precautions, relevant symptoms,
etc. The addition of suitable information by the employer would be permitted,
providing it does not detract in any way from the required statement.
Exposure to Vinyl Chloride, 39 Fed. Reg. 35,890, 35,895 (1974) (emphasis added).
80. With respect to FDA regulation of medical devices, express preemption language has
been included in the 1976 Medical Devices Amendments (MDA) to the Federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA). 21 U.S.C. § 360k (1988); see King v. Collagen Corp., 983
F.2d 1130, 1139 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that regulations under the Medical Device Amend-
ments of 1976 preempted plaintiff's failure to warn claims against manufacturer of cosmetic
medical device); Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416, 1421 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding the
same).
81. 748 F. Supp. 672 (C.D. Ill. 1990), arid, 13 F.3d 1090 (7th Cir. 1994).
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Regulatory Commission. The plaintiff argued that the instrument mis-
recorded the exposure numbers at the time of the incident, and that the ac-
tual dose of radiation he received greatly exceeded the recorded numbers.
The court did not resolve the question of measuring the actual exposure, but
did resolve a preliminary question, on which it granted plaintiff's petition for
an interlocutory appeal. The court answered the question of whether the
regulation setting a permissible dose should be adopted as the standard of
care in the affirmative.82
The court in O'Conner thus accepted defendant's argument that "it is not
proper to allow the jury to disregard the federal permissible dose limits and
effectively set their own."'8 3 The court noted that the "federal permissible
dose limits are based upon the national and international scientific consensus
as to the hypothetical risk from exposure to low occupational levels of ioniz-
ing radiation."'8 4 It then concluded that "[i]n determining the likelihood of
the injury from radiation, this Court believes that it should give deference to
the administrative regulations which are the result of an agency's applied
expertise."85 As the attorney who represented the utility company defend-
ant in O'Conner has written, "the O'Conner doctrine has a much broader
application than just to radiation litigation.... [T]here are many other regu-
lated toxic substances that may qualify for similar treatment."'8 6
In the case of FDA drug approval, a recent Pennsylvania concurring opin-
ion adopts, without citing O'Conner, essentially the same rationale in sup-
port of its conclusion that strict product liability should not apply to
prescription drugs.87 Also, O'Conner finds support in administrative law de-
82. Id. at 678. Comment (a) to Section 288C of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states
that a court may, in its discretion, adopt a legislative enactment or administrative regulation as
the common law test of due care. See supra note 5. Although O'Conner does not mention this
section of the Restatement, it appears to be the first reported decision in which comment (a)
has, in effect, been applied in a case involving exposure to a toxic agent. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit subsequently denied the plaintiff's petition for inter-
locutory appeal. O'Conner v. Commonwealth Edison Co., No. 90-8103 (7th Cir. Oct. 26,
1990); see O'Conner v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 807 F. Supp. 1376, 1379 (C.D. 11. 1992),
af'd, 13 F.3d 1090 (7th Cir. 1994).
83. O'Conner, 748 F. Supp. at 676.
84. Id. at 677.
85. Id.
86. Donald E. Jose, Philadelphia Attorney Discusses 'Permissible' Toxics Levels, Toxic
Chemicals Litig. Rep. (Andrews) 14,596, 14,598 (Aug. 21, 1991). Of course, where industry
itself agrees that the current regulatory exposure limit is obsolescent and too high, as is the
case with the current limit for MC, it is not possible to argue that the O'Conner doctrine
applies. The argument would also be difficult to make if, subsequent to the date the exposure
limit was set (or, in the case of FDA, the drug was approved), evidence of a new toxic effect
became available, and a plaintiff subsequently suffered from that effect before the agency had
time to consider a new, lower limit or new warning language.
87. Hahn v. Richter, 628 A.2d 860, 870-71 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (Cavanaugh, J., concur-
ring). Because Judge Cavanaugh's opinion corresponds so closely to a central thesis of this
Article, it is quoted from extensively below:
Two important, interrelated, public policy considerations exist for treating a
prescription drug different [sic] than other manufactured products. First, pre-
scription drugs are (potentially) inherently dangerous products whose costs are
considered by society to be more beneficial than its [sic] potential harm. Second,
the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") has the institutional capacity and
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cisions. For example, the Supreme Court of the United States has stated that
when an agency "is making predictions, within its area of special expertise,
legislative mandate for weighing the costs and benefits for particular pharma-
ceutical ....
The first important policy consideration in this area is that prescription drugs
are inherently dangerous products which are considered, ex ante, beneficial to
society as a whole. Unlike most manufactured products, prescription drugs are
considered dangerous. When not properly dispensed, prescription drugs can
cause sickness or even death. Consequently, society has heavily regulated their
use, such that they can be taken only when prescribed and monitored by a physi-
cian. Despite their inherently dangerous nature, we tolerate their use because
the gain for society as a whole outweighs the risk that they may harm particular
individuals. Unlike most other manufactured products, prescription drugs play
a significant role in dissipating suffering and in prolonging human life ....
The second policy consideration in this area is that the FDA has a particular
institutional capacity to determine whether a pharmaceutical's health benefits
outweigh its risks. Congress has created a regulatory agency, the FDA, to "pro-
tect consumers from dangerous products." United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S.
689, 696 (1948). In approving a new drug application, the FDA balances the
"expected therapeutic gains" against the "risks entailed by its use." United
States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 555 (1979). Before a new drug is approved,
federal law requires (1) preliminary evaluation of a pharmaceutical's chemical
and therapeutic properties; (2) testing in animal models; (3) detailed protocols
for testing in humans; (4) double-blind, placebo-controlled testing on several
hundred persons; and (5) at least two long-term clinical trials including large
groups of patients to assess safety, effectiveness and optimal dosage. See 47 Fed.
Reg. 46,622, et seq. (Oct. 19, 1982); 48 Fed. Reg. 26,720, et seq. (June 9, 1983);
21 U.S.C. §§ 301, et seq. (1988).
This agency not only has the responsibility, but the resources, to fulfill its
mission of balancing the risks against the benefits of particular pharmaceuticals.
The application is reviewed by many types of health professionals who work
within the FDA's National Center for Drugs and Biologies, including physi-
cians, pharmacologists, chemists, and microbiologists. 47 Fed. Reg. 46,626
(Oct. 19, 1982). The recommendation of the health professionals is in turn re-
viewed by management personnel within the National Center for Drugs and
Biologics before a final decision is made on the drug's application. Id. After the
application is approved, the FDA has a process for monitoring adverse reactions
to an approved pharmaceutical, as federal regulations mandate that all adverse
reactions to a pharmaceutical be reported to the agency. 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(b).
A drug manufacturer typically spends millions of dollars in developing or test-
ing new drugs. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act:
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 98th Cong.
2d Sess. 106 (1984).
Based on the above, I would accordingly find that public policy is best served
by not applying the doctrine of strict liability to prescription drugs. Prescription
drugs are inherently dangerous products which benefit society. Moreover, a fed-
eral agency exists which is devoted to weighing the known benefits and costs of
marketing a particular drug.... The FDA is in a unique position to make the
decision whether a drug is efficacious, and to preserve the incentive for a com-
pany to produce a beneficial pharmaceutical. Juries and the judiciary do not
have the requisite knowledge, resources, or societal mandate to make the deci-
sion as to a prescription drug's relative worth.
Id. at 870-71 (parallel citations omitted).
This Article's only criticism of Judge Cavanaugh's reasoning relates to his attempt to draw a
distinction between prescription drugs and other products. If Judge Cavanaugh had not
drawn such a distinction, however, the logic of his position would have compelled him to
advocate the abandonment of the doctrine of strict liability as to all heavily regulated products.
Judge Cavanaugh's statement that prescription drugs differ from most manufactured products
in that they play a significant a role in prolonging human life may be oversimplistic, in light of
studies suggesting that economically productive activity, which requires the efficient use of
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at the frontiers of science[,] ... a reviewing court must generally be at its
most deferential."8 8 The reason courts accord such deference to the agency
is that the courts themselves lack scientific expertise, a consideration that
applies to all civil litigation, whether a case falls within the court's toxic tort
jurisdiction or within its administrative review jurisdiction.
O'Conner represents a departure from the traditional view that compli-
ance with regulatory standards provides only some evidence, rather than
conclusive evidence, of due care. This traditional view is based on "the gen-
eral assumption of the law... that it is desirable to use two remedial systems
[tort and regulatory] and require that the enterprise conform to whichever of
the two standards is more stringent. '89 As argued in a recent law review
note, however, while
[s]uch dual regulation may have been reasonable prior to the New Deal,
when government regulation did little more than slightly modify ex-
isting judge-made law[,] . . .defendants operating within highly regu-
lated fields may plead with conviction that compliance with strict,
complex regulations should suffice to immunize them from tort
liability.90
This note cites specific examples of pervasively regulated fields, including
nuclear power, pharmaceutical production, and aviation manufacture. The
same considerations, however, apply today to known or possible carcinogens
such as MC, 2,4-D, vinyl chloride, asbestos, benzene, and others that have
likewise been subjected to extensive regulatory control and searching regula-
tory scrutiny. 91
industrial chemicals, is itself essential to good public health. Wealthy nations, in other words,
have always tended to be healthy nations. See BREYER, supra note 1, at 99-100 nn. 118-22.
88. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87, 103
(1983). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, which reviews more chal-
lenges to agency rulemaking than does any other court, applied the same standard of deference
in reviewing OSHA's estimate of health effects from asbestos exposure, stating: "When called
upon to review technical determinations on matters to which the agency lays claim to special
expertise, the courts are at their most deferential." Building & Constr. Trades Dep't v. Brock,
838 F.2d 1258, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
89. 1 ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY STUDY, supra note 68, at 84-85.
90. Paul Dueffert, Note, The Role of Regulatory Compliance in Tort Actions, 26 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 175, 177 (1989) (footnotes omitted).
91. The note also justifies the preemptive effect of the labelling act for cigarettes, in terms
that equally apply to regulation of known or suspect industrial carcinogens:
As is the case with actions against nuclear power producers, courts are un-
willing [with respect to issues of weighing health risks and economic benefits] to
second-guess Congress, especially as they are limited in expertise, burdened by
rules of evidence, constrained by busy dockets, and do not possess the fact-find-
ing machinery of the legislature. Second, the federal statute is thought to im-
pose needed uniformity in regulating tobacco, a uniformity that individual
courts are not wont to disturb. Finally, the [statute] was the product of bitterly
partisan infighting, and courts find it improper to intrude on this legislative de-
bate .... Where governing regulation-federal or state, formally preemptive or
not-is so much the product of intense political debate, courts should not de-
value that debate by subjecting regulated conduct to additional tort liability.
Id. at 214 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
Politics likewise plays a role in the regulation of suspect carcinogens by OSHA. For exam-
ple, in response to OSHA's proposal to greatly lower exposure limits for MC, owner-operators
of small paint-stripping shops, of which there are several thousand in this country, have com-
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Regulatory agencies are subject to criticism for the delays involved in
rulemaking. OSHA's 1991 notice of proposed rulemaking for MC followed,
by more than six years, a July 1985 petition for a new exposure limit submit-
ted by the United Auto Workers.92 OSHA's final rule is not expected until
1994, at which time the rule may well be challenged in court. From its
inception in 1971 through 1989, the year in which OSHA issued a set of new
permissible exposure limits for 428 toxic substances, which was subsequently
successfully challenged in court,93 OSHA had conducted rulemaking pro-
ceedings and issued rules with respect to only twenty-four toxic
substances. 94
Unless Congress amends OSHA's governing act, the best hope for acceler-
ating the process of issuing revised standards that will reflect new knowledge
concerning workplace hazards of chemicals may lie in "negotiated regula-
tion" 95 between industry and labor. Negotiated rulemaking with respect to
benzene was tried, but failed, in the early 1980s. One stumbling block was
the "[i]ndustry's demand for a preamble [to the negotiated regulation] find-
ing no significant risk at 1 ppm (designed to protect firms from tort litiga-
tion).' '96 Negotiated regulation in the chemical safety area might have a
better chance of success if more courts follow the lead of the O'Conner court
and find that, even in the absence of such a specifically-worded regulatory
finding, compliance with regulatory exposure limits immunizes defendants
from tort liability. For example, it is difficult to imagine that any manufac-
turer of a product suspected to cause cancer, on the basis of animal testing,
would not agree, as part of negotiated regulation, to label language similar to
that, quoted above, which OSHA and CPSC have devised for MC, if the
manufacturer had assurance that its agreement would preclude a subsequent
attack on the warning in tort litigation.
plained to their Congresspersons and submitted comments or testimony in strong opposition to
the proposal. Such individuals, who themselves have MC exposure, have generally requested
that the new limit be set at a higher level than the level suggested by the manufacturers of MC.
Author's Inspection of Documents in OSHA Docket Office. Likewise, tighter controls on per-
chloroethylene, the chemical used in dry cleaning, are also politically sensitive because of the
expense of installing new equipment to achieve lower emissions and the large number of dry
cleaning shop owners in this country.
92. See Occupational Exposure to Methylene Chloride, 56 Fed. Reg. 57,035, 57,038
(1991).
93. AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 986-87 (1 th Cir. 1992). OSHA claimed that its
attempt to set new limits for the 428 additional substances represented "a much needed revi-
sion of the existing standards" originally set in 1971. Id. at 987. The reviewing court found,
however, that OSHA's streamlined approach to this multi-substance rulemaking, which was
challenged by both industry and labor, was "not consistent with the requirements of the OSH
Act." Id.
94. CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND GOVERNMENT, RISK AND
THE ENVIRONMENT: IMPROVING REGULATORY DECISION MAKING 57 (1993).
95. For a recent discussion of how such "reg-neg" operates, see Ellen Siegler, Regulatory
Negotiations: A Practical Perspective, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,647 (Oct. 1992).





Case-by-case litigation does not provide an efficient means of dealing with
the problem of carcinogenic and other toxic exposures. Judge Breyer is
justly critical of a system that "leaves the determination of 'too much risk' in
the hands of tens of thousands of different juries."'97 The same criticism can
be leveled at a system that leaves the design of warnings in the hands of tens
of thousands of juries. Breyer rightly questions: "Who now reads the warn-
ings on aspirin bottles, or the pharmaceutical drug warnings that run on, in
tiny print, for several pages?"98 The tort law case-by-case approach to de-
signing warnings is inefficient, and perhaps dangerous.99 This Article has
discussed a number of recent decisions that suggest that the court system, in
the face of the relatively recent onslaught of toxic tort litigation, is beginning
both to come to grips with its own limitations and to recognize that judicial
deference to well-considered regulatory findings and actions can promote the
economic, fair, and predictable resolution of mass tort litigation involving
toxic substances.
97. BREYER, supra note 1, at 59.
98. Id. at 28.
99. As a perceptive law review article explains, the case-by-case approach to designing
warnings creates "legal incentive to eschew selective warnings [in favor of] extremely detailed
comprehensive warnings. Courts that have preferred quantity of information over quality of
communication not only allow, but also encourage, manufacturers to design legalistic warnings
intended more to escape liability than to prevent accidents." Victor E. Schwartz & Russell W.
Driver, Warnings in the Workplace. The Need for a Synthesis of Law and Communication
Theory, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 38, 60 (1983). The article continues:
The legal evaluation of product warnings generally occurs in the context of
products liability litigation. Products liability cases tend to focus on the particu-
lar hazard that caused the plaintiff's injury, not the full array of possible
hazards. When a person is injured by a very remote risk, the remoteness of the
risk tends to be obscured by the reality of the plaintiff's injury. Courts generally
do not ask how many other risks the manufacturer might also be required to
warn about. Thus, the legal system's apparent preference for comprehensive
warnings is less the result of a considered evaluation of the warnings problem
than the net effect of hundreds of narrowly focused products liability cases.
Id. at 60 n.108.
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